Friday 21 September 2012

The Way Forward



The quarter final loss in the 2007 Rugby World Cup hurt New Zealand terribly, sending the country into a state of depression. Winning for the All Blacks was a habit but so was losing in pressure situations at the Rugby World Cup and the 2007 tournament was no exception. Coming into the tournament as favourites, the All Blacks were expected to walk over Les Bleus in the quarter final but experiencing pressures that cannot be replicated on the training pitch, or anywhere else for that matter, the All Blacks began to implode at the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff. 

In the aftermath of the RWC disappointment, Graham Henry was controversially reappointed as head coach ahead of the in-favour Robbie Deans. Sensing the need for change, Henry and the New Zealand brains trust sat down and re-evaluated the previous four year campaign in order to identify weaknesses and mistakes they had made along the way. They identified their controversial ‘reconditioning‘ programme as a major blunder as well as the lack of on-field leadership in pressure situations. After much thought and deliberation, Henry decided that the All Blacks would embark on a campaign of empowering their players by, firstly, involving a senior group of players in the decision making of the team and, secondly, by improving the overall basic skill level of the team so as to improve their adaptability for whatever game plan Henry had to throw at them. 

The approach culminated in the All Blacks narrowly winning the 2011 RWC final in front of a packed crowd at Eden Park, the first time in 24 years. As much as there were mistakes made along the way, the approach taken by the All Blacks was one which has shaped their game for the better, making them less susceptible to uncontrollable conditions.

The interesting thing about the All Black loss in Cardiff, in 2007, was the striking resemblance to the Springbok loss in last year's RWC quarter final against Australia. Both games were riddled with controversy due to atrocious refereeing resulting in dramatic upsets. The worrying thing in South Africa, and New Zealand for that matter, was the inclination to believe that the respective losses were solely caused by poor refereeing. Although the officials' decisions did play a role in the outcome, the glaringly obvious fact was a lack of preparation by the teams favoured to win. Both teams overlooked the possibility of a 'Black Swan' event, i.e. the impact of the highly improbable. Although it's difficult to predict the nature of such an event, measures can be put in place to insulate one's self in the case of such occurrences. Imagine if the All Blacks had three players on the field who could slot drop kicks with ease in 2007 or if the Springboks had the skill level and ability to score a try when it mattered against Australia in 2011. Both teams were playing for penalties but Wayne Barnes and Bryce Lawrence, respectively, were having none of it.

What is the way forward? 

We cannot change the past but we can learn from it. The All Blacks were smart enough to learn from the mistakes they made in 2007 and it's imperative for the Springboks to do the same. We've already put ourselves on the back foot by seemingly discarding Peter De Villiers. Although he has his critics, one cannot discount the fact that he must've learned valuable lessons during his tenure as Springbok coach. I'm willing to bet that half of the mistakes that Heyneke Meyer has made were previously made by De Villiers and why make the same mistakes twice? A system of apprenticeship needs to be put in place. A Springbok coaching staff needs to be selected with the view of continuity.  Would it not make sense to select an assistant coach with the vision that he would become head coach four to eight years later? To put things into perspective, Steve Hansen, the current All Black coach, has been in the national coaching set up since 2004.

Our leadership model needs a rethink. The days of dictatorial leadership, at the highest level, are long gone. The inherent variability of the modern game highlights the need for leaders and thinkers on the field. Leaders on the field don't need to deal with complexity but they do need to know how to deal with change. Losing both John Smit and Victor Matfield has clearly impacted the Boks but we need new leaders to emerge. For this to happen, a conducive environment needs to be created whereby players are encouraged to take ownership of the team through participating in the off-field decision making. Deciding on how the team must play should not be a contest of who has the biggest ego but a model whereby ideas are thrown around and subsequently developed with the goal of constant improvement. I can't help but think that Jean De Villiers is frustrated by his lack of influence on the way that the Boks are playing. We need to get to the point whereby the coach becomes a facilitator and not a dictator. Greater involvement in the off-field leadership, by the players, will translate into greater on-field performances.

We need to become adaptive. The improvement of basic skills across the board is of paramount importance. It may be difficult in the short term, but a concerted effort over the next four years will go a long way in improving our skill level. We need to identify the skills in which we are lacking and develop long term plans to improve them at both national and provincial level. Taking a forward-looking approach, would it not make sense to develop the players' efficiency at ruck time so that we would need to commit less players with the assumption that rugby is likely to become even faster? Again, assuming that the game will speed up, should we not develop our handling skills to the level where we have the ability to dictate the pace of the game when we have possession? For this to be successfully implemented, the goals of the franchises need to be synchronized with those of the national team. It doesn't help if every union is focusing on different areas of the game if it's not going to be beneficial to the national team. At the end of the day we need to work towards a common goal and that is elevating the Springboks to the top of world rugby. 

Springbok results of late have not been promising. Many have blamed the poor performances on a defective game plan. Although our game plan appears to be deeply flawed, we should not necessarily attempt to replicate the game plan of the All Blacks, we are not the All Blacks. We are the Springboks and it's about time that we start imposing ourselves on world rugby with a style of rugby that is forward looking and that will take us to the pinnacle of world rugby once again.







Thursday 6 September 2012

The Moneyball Approach



The non-selection of the young Stormers loose-forward, Siyamthanda Kolisi, has sparked somewhat of a debate around South Africa, as many felt that he was a better player than the incumbent Springbok openside flanker, Marcell Coetzee. Whilst reading through some of the comments made on various social media platforms, I found myself fairly ambivalent on the issue as no one could provide me with a convincing argument. Seeking clarity, I took it upon myself to delve deeper into the issue. 

It was 2002 and Billy Beane, the General Manager of the Oakland Athletics, a Major League Baseball Team, was faced with a dilemma. The Athletics had narrowly lost in the play-offs to the Yankees in the previous season and were now facing the prospect of losing their three star players to free agency. Facing budgetary constraints which seemed insurmountable, the Athletics set about replacing those lost stars. 

Convention was thrown out the window as the Athletics embarked on a campaign of adopting a revolutionary approach to the game using ‘Sabermetrics’- the specialized analysis of baseball through objective evidence- which became popularly known as ‘MoneyBall’. The basic idea was to replicate these lost stars in aggregate as opposed to simply replacing them man for man.  In order to do so, they had to sign seemingly average players, at a discount, who were undervalued by the system that coaches and managers were currently using. The decision to sign these particular players was not based on their potential or because they had an attractive swing but rather using a statistical approach based on the player's ability to get to first base. Once signed, the players were guided by statistics on which shots to play for them to generate runs. As the process became more accurate over time and by defying all existing baseball logic, the Athletics were able to develop a winning formula which resulted in a twenty game winning streak during the season.

The approach is fairly simple, indentify a weakness and mitigate it. Identify a strength and amplify it. Although significantly different from Baseball in terms of variability, the game of Rugby can learn a great deal from this approach. Player stats are easily attainable but when they are viewed in isolation they don’t really mean much. The difficult part is finding meaning in the stats which can then be applied in developing a winning model. 

The Kolisi-Coetzee conundrum should be no different. Both of these talented youngsters played a significant role this season as ball carriers and defensive stalwarts for the Stormers and Sharks, respectively.
Using the Moneyball Approach and considering the game plan currently being employed by Heyneke Meyer, which player was better suited for higher honours?

Super Rugby 2012 stats. (Courtesy of Fox Sports)

Coetzee
Minutes played: 1333
Ball Carries: 195
Tackles Bust: 53
Offloads: 26
Linebreaks: 5
Tackles Made: 273
Tackles Missed: 36

Kolisi
Minutes played: 1167
Ball Carries: 81
Tackles Bust: 31
Offloads: 5
Linebreaks: 3
Tackles Made: 223
Tackles Missed: 22

On face value these stats tell you that Coetzee does more on the park than Kolisi and he may, therefore, be assumed to be a better player. With a slight bit of manipulation, take a look at this:

Coetzee:
Carries per Tackle bust: 3.68
Carries per line break: 39
Carries per Offload: 7.5
Tackles per Missed Tackle: 7.58

Kolisi
Carries per Tackle bust: 2.61
Carries per line break: 27
Carries per Offload: 16.2
Tackles per Missed Tackle: 10.13

What the stats now tell you is that Kolisi is a more effective ball carrier and defender. The approach, considering the Springbok game plan, should’ve been to select Kolisi and give him the ball more often. At the Stormers, Kolisi is subjected to a game plan which is focused primarily on defense and, as a result, does not get the opportunity to carry the ball as much as Coetzee but when he does he is far more effective. The mere fact that he is playing at a franchise which is not attack minded should not be the deciding factor on whether or not he becomes a Springbok. 

This type of approach to selection would ensure that the best player gets picked based on facts and not on the gut feel of the selectors. If the game plan was one of continuity then the selection of Coetzee would make sense considering his superior offloading skills, but how many times has he offloaded the ball for Heyneke Meyer's Springboks this season? This statistical approach does not stop at selection. What should then happen is an analysis of Kolisi’s ball carrying in terms of where on the field the majority of his tackle breaks come from, e.g. how far away from the ruck is he when he gets the ball and breaks a tackle? Once these stats are available, it would then make sense to put Kolisi in these positions more often to amplify his ball carrying ability. This approach should not come across as being ground breaking, it just makes logical sense.

Although skills development should be the long term approach for Springbok success, I feel that selecting the right players in the right positions for the desired game plan is of paramount importance in the short term. For instance, it wouldn’t make sense to select Mvovo if you plan to kick constantly on his wing because he is not the best player in the air. If you plan to run the ball, however, his selection begins to make sense. We need to start looking at these decisions not based on emotion but rather on cold, hard facts. If a player is performing and is best suited for a particular game plan then he needs to be selected.

At international level, coaches are lucky enough to decide on a game plan and then select the appropriate players. At club and university level, the available players often dictate the game plan. Gaining an understanding of this dynamic will lead coaches to develop a winning strategy which best suits their circumstances. I feel that the use of statistics and video analysis will aid them in doing so. The Moneyball approach is yet to influence Rugby as it has Baseball, but with continued experimentation and refinement we could potentially see average teams transform into winning ones.